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Climate change is expected to impact agricultural land use. Steadily accumulating 27 
changes in temperature and water availability can alter the relative profitability of 28 
different farming activities and promote land use changes. There is also potential for 29 
high-impact ‘climate tipping points’ where abrupt, non-linear change in climate occurs 30 
- such as the potential collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation 31 
(AMOC). Here, using data from Great Britain, we develop a methodology to analyse the 32 
impacts of a climate tipping point on land use and economic outcomes for agriculture. 33 
We show that economic/land use impacts of such a tipping point are likely to include 34 
widespread cessation of arable farming with losses of agricultural output, an order of 35 
magnitude larger than the impacts of climate change without an AMOC collapse. The 36 
agricultural effects of AMOC collapse could be ameliorated by technological 37 
adaptations such as widespread irrigation, but the amount of water required and the 38 
costs appear prohibitive in this instance. 39 
 40 
Tipping points can occur in elements of the climate system1, in ecosystems2, and in coupled 41 
social-ecological systems3 where, often because of prior cumulative effects, a small change in 42 
drivers generates an abrupt response in a system - qualitatively changing its future state. The 43 
potential difficulties of reversing changes caused by tipping points4 means there is a pressing 44 
need to understand their potential impacts and the extent to which such impacts can be 45 
ameliorated. However, economic assessments of the impacts of large-scale climate tipping 46 
points are rare4-6, typically of low resolution7, and often contested8,9.  47 
To address these issues, we consider a well-studied tipping point; collapse of the Atlantic 48 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)10,11. The AMOC includes surface ocean 49 
currents that transport heat from the tropics to the northeast Atlantic region benefiting 50 
Western Europe, including the agricultural system of Great Britain (GB). We contrast the 51 
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impacts of conventional (hereafter ‘smooth’) climate change with that of a climate tipping 52 
point involving AMOC collapse on agricultural land use and its economic value in GB, with 53 
or without a technological response. Our climate projections span 2020 to 2080 and use a 54 
mid-range climate change scenario as a baseline (Figure 1a-f; see Methods, subsequent 55 
discussion of uncertainties such as weather variability, and sensitivity analysis in Extended 56 
Data; results reported in the main paper are mean effects). We take an existing simulation of 57 
the effects of AMOC collapse12,13 and treat it as a set of anomalies that can be linearly 58 
combined with the baseline (smooth) climate change scenario. We nominally assume AMOC 59 
collapse occurs over the time period 2030 to 2050 (Figure 1g-l; see Methods). This is a low 60 
probability fast and early collapse of the AMOC compared to current expectations14, 61 
emphasising the idealised nature of our study and our focus on assessing impacts. That said, 62 
the AMOC has recently weakened by ~15%15 and models may be biased to favour a stable 63 
AMOC relative to observations16.   64 
We predict the production decisions of individual farms at 2 km x 2 km grid resolution 65 
building upon an econometric land-use model17 and the detailed dataset18 employed by the 66 
Natural Environment Valuation (NEV) model, which underpinned the UK National 67 
Ecosystem Assessment19. Smooth changes in climate (Figure 1a-f) alter the relative 68 
profitability of agricultural products generating changes in land-use. For example, arable 69 
production is generally more profitable than grassland meat production in GB (see Extended 70 
Data Figure 1) but is limited by physical restrictions, such as topography or low temperatures. 71 
Climate change can raise temperatures, extending the area where cropping is economically 72 
viable provided that rainfall is sufficient18. Relative to ‘smooth’ climate change, a climate 73 
tipping point is likely to induce more abrupt land-use changes. For example, an AMOC 74 
collapse (Figure 1g-l) is expected to induce significant reductions in rainfall20, which could 75 
rapidly shift land out of arable production21. A technological response to rainfall reductions in 76 
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the agriculturally productive lowlands of the south and east might be to irrigate them. These 77 
climate and technological responses lead to four scenario combinations of land-use change 78 
under climate change; with or without AMOC collapse and with or without a technological 79 
(irrigation) response22. 80 
 81 
Figure 1. Temperature and rainfall for the growing season (April to September) in 2020 82 
and 2080.  a) - c) Temperature in oC under smooth climate change. g) - i) Temperature in oC 83 
under abrupt climate change. d) - f) Rainfall in mm/growing season under smooth climate 84 
change. j) - l) Rainfall in mm/growing season under abrupt climate change. a), d), g), j) 85 
Climate data for 2020. b), e), h), k) Climate data for 2080. c), f), i), l) Difference between 86 
2020 and 2080 climate variables; a positive (negative) value represents an increase 87 
(decrease) in 2080 compared to 2020. 88 
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Land use change under smooth climate change 89 
Figure 2a maps land-use in 2020 as predicted by the agricultural model based on a spatially 90 
explicit analysis of physical environment, climate, economic, and policy data from the 1960s 91 
to the present day, allowing for climate trends over that period. Here physical constraints and 92 
cool temperatures are expected to constrain high value arable production mainly to the 93 
lowlands of south and east GB.  94 
Our smooth climate change scenario results in a substantial 1.9oC mean warming in the 95 
growing season in 2080 relative to 2020 (from an average of 12.6oC, Figure 1a, c, see 96 
Methods) together with a modest 20 mm mean decline in growing season rainfall (from an 97 
average of 445 mm, Figure 1d,f). Assuming that the AMOC is maintained then climate 98 
change is likely to induce a significant and profitable increase in the intensity of arable 99 
production across most lowland areas (Figure 2b, c, contrast with Figure 2a). These results 100 
indicate a modest increase in overall arable area, but in parts of eastern England, high 101 
temperatures and declining rainfall result in a reduction in arable production (Figure 2b). 102 
Taking these differing effects into account, overall, GB arable area rises from 32% to 36% of 103 
total agricultural area (see Extended Data Figure 2, Extended Data Figure 3), increasing 104 
agricultural output value by approximately £40million per annum by 2080 (assuming 105 
2017/18 agricultural prices). This value may increase further if, as best estimates suggest22,23, 106 
real (inflation adjusted) agricultural prices increase somewhat over the period as a result of 107 
climate change23-26 and other factors27,28. 108 
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 Figure 109 
2. Impact of smooth and abrupt climate and economic change on the share of arable 110 
farmland in 2020 and 2080. a) Arable farmland for 2020. b), d), f), h), arable farmland for 111 
2080 under the four scenarios considered. c), e), g), i) Time series (England only) for mean 112 
climate and economic measures from 2020 to 2080 under the four scenarios considered. 113 
Water supply refers to the combination of rainfall and irrigation (if applicable). 114 
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Under smooth climate change, approximately 14% of GB is likely to be rainfall-limited by 115 
2080 (Figure 4). If this proportion was irrigated from 2050, this would lead to an even greater 116 
rise in arable area—up from 32% to 42% of total agricultural land (Figure 2d, e, Extended 117 
Data Figure 3). This generates an increase in agricultural production value of £125million per 118 
annum by 2080. The overall water requirements for such an intervention are relatively 119 
modest, with average demand across irrigated areas equivalent to approximately 18 mm of 120 
extra rainfall during the growing season. Nevertheless, recent estimates of the costs of  121 
Figure 3. Limiting factors from an AMOC collapse on the share of arable land. a) 122 
Arable farmland for 2020. b) Arable farmland for 2080 with temperature based on an AMOC 123 
collapse and rainfall under smooth climate change (no AMOC collapse). c) Arable farmland 124 
for 2080 with rainfall based on an AMOC collapse and temperature under smooth climate 125 
change (no AMOC collapse). 126 
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irrigating GB wheat production29 show that these costs exceed the value of additional 127 
production; in short, from an economic perspective, unless future arable crop prices rose 128 
sufficiently, such investment may not be worthwhile. 129 
Land use change under a climate tipping point 130 
Our remaining scenarios impose a collapse of the AMOC over the period 2030-2050 overlaid 131 
on the smooth climate change trend. A previous study that combined a rapid AMOC collapse 132 
with future climate projections demonstrated that temperatures will continue to rise globally, 133 
but with a delay of 15 years, while GB temperatures will be dependent upon the AMOC12,30-134 
32. In the present study, the AMOC collapse reverses the warming seen in the smooth climate 135 
change scenarios, generating an average fall in temperature of 3.4oC by 2080 accompanied by 136 
a substantial reduction in rainfall, falling by 123 mm during the growing season (Extended 137 
Data Figure 2 and Extended Data Figure 4).  138 
Holding real prices constant, then in the absence of a technological response (i.e. irrigation), 139 
rainfall (and to a lesser extent temperature) limitation due to AMOC collapse is predicted to 140 
affect arable farming in many areas (Figure 2f, g). The expected overall area of arable 141 
production is predicted to fall dramatically from 32% to 7% of land area (Extended Data 142 
Figure 2, Extended Data Figure 3). This in turn generates a major reduction in the value of 143 
agricultural output, falling by £346million per annum (Table 1), representing a ~10% 144 
reduction in total income from GB farming33. The key driver of the arable loss seen across 145 
GB is climate drying due to AMOC collapse, rather than cooling (Figure 3b, c). This adds 146 
considerably to the part of Eastern England that is already vulnerable to arable loss due to 147 
drying under baseline climate change (green band in Figures 2b, 3b). Part of eastern Scotland 148 
has a potential gain in arable production suppressed by the cooling effects of an AMOC 149 
collapse (contrast Figures 2f and 3c), but the loss of potential arable production due to 150 
cooling is small compared to the impacts of drying. However, the assumption of constant real 151 
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prices is less plausible under the major global food system dislocation caused by a collapse of 152 
the AMOC. While firm estimates are not available, substantial food price increases are 153 
thought likely22,34. With the physical limits imposed by AMOC collapse constraining farm 154 
production, such price increases mean that wellbeing losses may be significantly higher than 155 
those calculated here, implying that our results should be viewed as lower bound, 156 
conservative estimates of the impacts of such a scenario.  157 
 158 
Table 1. Net impact on GB agriculture of smooth versus tipping point (AMOC collapse) 159 
climate change, with and without ameliorative measures (technological response). 160 
With a change in technology to implement sufficient irrigation from 2050, the drying effects 161 
of the AMOC collapse on arable production could be substantially offset (Figure 2h, i). In 162 
this scenario, land area under arable production still rises from 32% to 38% by 2080 with an 163 
accompanying increase in output value of £79million per annum (Table 1, Extended Data 164 
Figure 3). Nevertheless, this increase in extent and value are lower than under the second 165 
scenario where the AMOC is maintained, due to lower temperatures (contrast Figure 2h with 166 
2b). Furthermore, the more extreme reduction in rainfall caused by the AMOC collapse 167 
means that water required for adequate irrigation is much greater than under the scenario 168 
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where the AMOC is maintained. Under the AMOC collapse scenario, 54% of GB grid cells 169 
now require irrigation, with demand exceeding 150 mm in the growing season for some areas 170 
in the south and east of England (and an average demand across irrigated areas of 70 mm of 171 
extra rainfall) (Figure 4). This would require water storage (across seasons) or spatial 172 
redistribution across the country from areas of higher rainfall in the north and western 173 
uplands of GB. Irrigation costs incurred in this scenario are estimated at over £800million per 174 
year, more than 10 times the value of the arable production it would support (see Methods). 175 
So, again, irrigation costs outweigh amelioration benefits under climate change; a difference 176 
which is massively inflated by the climate tipping point of AMOC collapse. Our analysis also 177 
indicates the level of food cost increase (nearly three-quarters of a billion pounds) necessary 178 




Figure 4. GB water balance in 2080 during the growing season with irrigation available 181 
under the climate scenarios of the AMOC either maintained or collapsed. Water deficits 182 
(< 280 mm) during the growing season (April-September) where irrigation occurs (red) and 183 
areas with excess water (> 280 mm) (blue) during the growing season when a) AMOC is 184 
maintained or b) AMOC collapsed.  185 
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Future agriculture in Great Britain 186 
Table 1 summarises results from our analysis of the impacts of both smooth and abrupt 187 
climate change upon agriculture in GB. In the absence of a climate tipping point, smooth 188 
climate change results in an elevation of temperature with modest falls in water availability. 189 
Given the cool, moist present-day conditions of GB this results in a relatively small increase 190 
in agricultural net profits (smooth climate change, no technological change). A few areas, 191 
notably in Eastern England, experience rainfall limitations but the costs of irrigation 192 
outweigh the benefits of addressing these constraints (smooth climate change, with 193 
technological change). However, the introduction of a climate tipping point in the form of an 194 
AMOC collapse removes the possibility of any positive outcome for GB agriculture. 195 
Reductions in temperature, and especially rainfall, result in major losses in the value of 196 
agricultural production (abrupt climate change, no technological change). While 197 
technological change in terms of widespread irrigation can ameliorate reductions in arable 198 
output (abrupt climate change, with technological change), in the absence of major price 199 
increases (which are plausible but uncertain) the costs of such investments dwarf the benefits 200 
they would provide.  201 
Alongside economic uncertainties, agricultural land use, production and its value will also 202 
respond to a number of other variables including changes in farming systems41, 203 
technology35,36, national and international policy37,38. Even holding all of these factors 204 
constant, climate futures may themselves bring increased variability including more frequent 205 
weather extremes which may not be well reflected in mean temperature and rainfall 206 
trends26,39. A sensitivity analysis is therefore discussed in Methods with findings presented in 207 
Extended Data. This reveals substantial variability in results, however the key findings and 208 
relative comparison across our four scenarios remain. There are a number of reasons for 209 
expecting such relativities to be robust. First, while there is uncertainty between models 210 
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regarding the net effect of global warming and AMOC collapse on GB temperatures, this is 211 
not the major control on arable fraction. Instead, predicted drying due to AMOC collapse is 212 
the key control and this is robust across climate models (see Extended Data Figure 5). The 213 
climate model we use is conservative in its predicted drying, but nevertheless arable 214 
production is still largely eliminated under AMOC collapse. Hence using another climate 215 
model with greater predicted drying has relatively little scope to alter this key result. The 216 
major source of uncertainty in the economic analysis concerns future prices. Under smooth 217 
climate change real prices are generally expected to increase although only modestly. For 218 
example, IPCC23 estimate a median increase of 7.6% (range of 1 to 23%) in cereal prices by 219 
mid-century under smooth climate change. Previous analyses using the same agricultural land 220 
use model show that such price increases, if sustained, could yield similar scale effects to 221 
those induced by smooth climate change40. Given that potentially transformational 222 
improvements in food production technology28 and diets could dampen these effects, overall 223 
this suggests that the estimates reported in the present paper, which assume constant real 224 
prices, should be seen as lower bound but of appropriate magnitude. There are several other 225 
expected impacts of AMOC collapse on GB that are not considered. These include harsher 226 
winters, with greater storminess, and shortening of the growing season20,41. These would 227 
further tend to suppress arable production and challenge farming more generally. Weather 228 
variability is expected to increase under AMOC collapse and could lead to farmers 229 
diversifying their activity. Thus, whilst we already predict a nearly complete cessation of 230 
arable farming, the overall impact of AMOC collapse on farming activity and associated 231 
income could be considerably greater than we predict.  232 
Conclusion 233 
We have presented the first detailed case study of the national impacts of a climate tipping 234 
point on land-use, agricultural production and its economic value, together with an 235 
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assessment of the potential for technological change to ameliorate impacts. While smooth 236 
climate change can result in major changes in land-use and accompanying economic values, 237 
we show that passing a climate tipping point has the potential to generate order-of-magnitude 238 
greater economic impacts and that even these may be lower bound estimates. Our case study 239 
concerns just one sector in one country, within which we only examine one impact of the 240 
substantial land-use changes predicted. While agricultural production is obviously important, 241 
changes in land-use generate multiple impacts; the need to understand these changes, and 242 
their impacts on further sectors and countries, underlines the importance of many more such 243 
analyses.  244 
 245 
Methods 246 
Climate data 247 
Observational temperature and rainfall data from 1981-201042 were used to estimate the land-248 
use model on agricultural census data (June Agricultural Census panel from EDINA). 249 
Specifically, the surface observations, provided at 5 km x 5 km resolution, are averaged over 250 
the growing seasons (April to September) and bilinearly interpolated (ignoring topography) 251 
onto the 2 km x 2 km grid cell resolution used in the agricultural census.  252 
The projected future climate data used in the agricultural model is supplied by the Met Office 253 
Hadley Centre Regional Model Perturbed Physics Ensemble simulations for the 21st Century 254 
for the UK domain (HadRM3-PPE-UK)43. The runs consist of daily data that spans 1950-255 
2100 at 25 km x 25 km resolution over the UK and forms part of the UK Climate Projections, 256 
UKCP0944. The ensemble is designed to simulate the regional climate over the UK for the 257 
historical and medium emissions scenario SRES-A1B45. In this paper, we chose the standard 258 
run, where parameters are kept at their unperturbed values, corresponding to a 3.5K global 259 
climate sensitivity and again we bilinearly interpolate the data onto the 2 km grid used for the 260 
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agricultural model. The climate projections used in the agricultural model for any given year 261 
consist of the mean temperature and rainfall for the growing seasons (April to September) of 262 
the preceding 30 years. To correct for any systematic bias in the modelled climate projections 263 
the climate projections are bias corrected. The bias correction was performed by shifting the 264 
future projections by the mean bias between the modelled and observed data for 1960-1989 265 
(the mean temperature and rainfall for 1960-1989 during the growing season is shown in 266 
Extended Data Figure 6). 267 
For simulation of an AMOC collapse, we use data from an experiment that used the 268 
HadGEM3 model with the global configuration 2 (GC2), N216 atmospheric (~60 km) and 269 
ORCA025 ocean (~25 km)46. The coupled climate model simulations are a present-day 270 
control simulation and a simulation where the AMOC is collapsed using freshwater hosing 271 
after which the model is allowed to run freely13,20. Both runs contain seasonal mean averages 272 
for a 30-year period (again consistent with the time span used for estimation of the 273 
agricultural model) for temperature and rainfall once the model has reached steady state. 274 
Specifically, the data period 50 to 80 years after freshwater perturbations had ended were 275 
used for temperature and rainfall seasonal averages. Note the results of Mecking, et al.13 276 
suggest that the reduction of rainfall over the North Atlantic following the collapse reduces 277 
with time, however, this effect is believed to be negligible at GB latitudes. Extended Data 278 
Figure 4 shows the temperature and rainfall for the spring and summer (effectively 279 
exchanging September for March in the growing season) for the AMOC maintained and 280 
AMOC collapse scenarios.  281 
Combining the difference between the HadGEM3 runs and the difference between the 282 
transient runs with the observation data we were able to simulate an idealised AMOC 283 
collapse. This is consistent with findings from Drijfhout12, where a freshwater hosing run and 284 
a control run showed that the difference in surface air temperature after an AMOC collapse 285 
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between the two runs remains approximately constant. A progressive (not instantaneous) 286 
collapse of the AMOC was simulated by applying a linear weighting function to the AMOC 287 
difference data during the prescribed years the AMOC is weakening, namely 2030-2050. It 288 
should be noted that the speed of collapse is relatively fast and the linearity assumption 289 
idealised compared to what is predicted in some models. 290 
The subsequent cooling and drying observed following an AMOC collapse is consistent 291 
amongst models (see Extended Data Figure 5). Furthermore, the spatial pattern of greatest 292 
cooling in north west GB and least cooling in south east GB is prominent in an ensemble of 293 
freshwater hosing experiments in different climate models48.   294 
Agricultural model 295 
The agricultural land-use model builds on the data and the econometric methodology 296 
developed by Fezzi and Bateman17, subsequently forming an essential component of the UK 297 
National Ecosystem Assessment (e.g., Bateman, et al.47, NEA19). This approach is also 298 
recently used by Fezzi and Bateman18 to appraise the environmental impact of climate change 299 
adaptation on land-use and water quality. We use a simpler version of the model that focuses 300 
on understanding the determinants of agricultural land-use allocation between arable and 301 
grassland. While agricultural revenues change greatly with output prices, arable land is 302 
typically the highest-value agricultural activity in GB (exceptions are some very intensive 303 
dairy farms located in the South West of the country), and therefore provides a proxy for 304 
understanding the effects of climate change on the 72% of UK land area under agricultural 305 
production33. 306 
The land-use data are derived from the June Agricultural Census (JAC) panel from EDINA 307 
(www.edina.ac.uk), which are collected on a 2 km x 2 km grid (400 Ha) basis covering the 308 
entirety of GB for eleven unevenly spaced years from 1972 to 2010. This generates around 309 
55,000 grid-square records per year.  310 
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The model integrates germane environmental determinants of land-use among which are 311 
climate, soil characteristics and land gradient. Crop yield is not fixed but rather is allowed to 312 
depend on climate, soils, input levels, etc. and can therefore change across space and time.  313 
So crop productivity is allowed to alter as climate changes and farmers are allowed to adapt 314 
by changing crop varieties, fertilization methods etc. What we are not changing is the bundle 315 
of crop possibilities available to farmers. So, for example, no new genetically modified crops 316 
are brought into the analysis. The approach taken, not modelling yield directly but focusing 317 
on land use via a discrete choice model, is the most established statistical land use model 318 
approach, with contributions going back to Wu and Segerson48 and more recently Lubowski, 319 
Plantinga and Stavins49 as well as our own exposition of the approach given in Fezzi and 320 
Bateman5. Recent research50 also shows that such an approach implies underlying and 321 
theoretically consistent profit and yield functions. 322 
To account for non-linear effects, rainfall and temperature in the growing season (April to 323 
September) are modelled using piecewise linear functions. This approach allows us to capture 324 
changes in the proportion of land allocated to arable cropping resulting from different growth 325 
factors over a range of values (cf.18,51). An interaction term is also included to allow the effect 326 
of rainfall to depend on the effect of temperature and vice versa18,52. Soil characteristics 327 
include shares of peat, (s_peat), gravel (s_gravel), stones (s_stoney), or fragipan soil 328 
(s_fragipan) and three dummy variables representing soil texture, namely share of fine, 329 
medium and coarse soils (s_fine, s_medium, s_coarse). We used data from the Harmonised 330 
World Soil Database (HWSD): a 30 arc-second (approximately 1 km resolution) raster 331 
(regular gridded) database with over 16,000 different soil mapping units53. Finally, we 332 
include mean altitude (elev) and slope represented as mean slope (slope), both derived from 333 
the 50 m resolution Integrated Hydrological Digital Terrain Model (IHDTM) licensed from 334 
the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology54. 335 
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In order to address potential spatial autocorrelation, the approach in Fezzi and Bateman5 is 336 
followed and a cell every four along both the horizontal and vertical axis is sampled. We 337 
define grassland as the sum of rough grazing, permanent grassland and temporary grassland, 338 
and arable land as the sum of cereals, oilseed rape, root crops, and all other agricultural lands. 339 
The only significant agricultural land-use category excluded from the agricultural model is 340 
rural woodland, whose expansion and contractions are mainly driven by governmental 341 
subsidies which we assume remain constant across our climate change scenarios. As 342 
described on the source data website (www.edina.ac.uk), grid square land-use estimates can 343 
sometimes overestimate or underestimate the amount of agricultural land within an area, 344 
since their collection is based on the location of the main farm house. This feature is 345 
corrected by rescaling the sum of the different agricultural land-use areas assigned to each 346 
grid square to match with the total agricultural land derived using satellite land cover data 347 
and ancillary spatial data55 (Meridian Developed Land Use Areas, OS roads, OS railways; the 348 
National Inventory for Woodland and Trees) to locate areas that are used for agricultural 349 
production, urban activities, etc. 350 
For policy determinants of land-use decisions the share of each grid square designated as 351 
National Park (npark), Environmentally Sensitive Area (esa) and Greenbelts (greenbelt) are 352 
included. Environmentally Sensitive Areas, introduced in 1987 and extended in subsequent 353 
years, were launched to conserve and enhance areas of particular landscape and wildlife 354 
significance. Digital boundary data were downloaded from Natural England56 and the 355 
Scottish Government57. Spatial data for English greenbelts were licensed by Defra from the 356 
Ordinance Survey55. Presently, there is no national digital spatial boundary dataset for 357 
Scottish greenbelts. Each council provided information and PDF maps or ESRI shapefiles. 358 
For Wales, there is currently only one area of greenbelt (Newport and Cardiff), and its 359 
boundaries were derived from local development plans. 360 
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The dependent variable of the model is the share of agricultural land devoted to arable. We 361 
model this variable as a function of all the determinants of land-use in a reduced-form 362 
specification. After applying a logit transformation, this model can be estimated via quasi-363 
maximum likelihood (QML)58,59. The estimation results are reported in Extended Data Figure 364 
7. It can be observed that favourable environmental and topographical features (e.g. soil 365 
quality and less elevated areas), significantly increase the share of arable. It is also apparent 366 
that policy factors are in line with expectations, in this case reducing the share of arable as 367 
these reflect a greater amount of protected areas: such as for national parks. Almost all of the 368 
parameter estimates of the rainfall and temperature effects are also highly statistically 369 
significant. These non-linear impacts can also be observed in Extended Data Figure 8.  370 
Similarly, it emerges from Extended Data Figure 8 that warmer temperatures are beneficial 371 
for arable as this promotes plant growth with the trend increasing quite rapidly at first, and 372 
then more gradually. In the full sample, higher temperature extremes can have adverse 373 
impacts, but this is based on a small number of observations with average growing season 374 
temperatures above 14oC. For this reason, a subsample is taken as the non-linear climate 375 
effects are sensitive to the inclusion of these few observations. The estimates of all other 376 
variables are very similar regardless of basing the estimations on the full or subsample. A 377 
simple quadratic specification shows increases in predicted arable share with increasing 378 
temperature; this provides further evidence of the robustness of the study’s results to the 379 
model specification.  380 
It is also evident that higher accumulated rainfall over the growing season negatively affects 381 
arable share (e.g. from flooding or waterlogging) (Extended Data Figure 8). When all 382 
observations are used, the estimates also corroborate a downward trend of arable with respect 383 
to average rainfall of less than 300 mm but few observations exist below 290 mm. The few 384 
observations with lower rainfall levels are also those with observed higher average 385 
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temperatures. However, under the smooth and abrupt (AMOC collapse) climate change 386 
scenarios we consider in this study there is a growing shift towards less rainfall in the 387 
summer and therefore the functional form requires extending below 290 mm. We apply a 388 
conservative approach by applying a linear extrapolation to the downward trend (Extended 389 
Data Figure 8). Using land cover data from the European Space Agency Climate Change 390 
Initiative60 and average growing season rainfall values from 1988-2017 (CRU TS4.0261), we 391 
have provided arable share for rainfall values that go outside the range of GB data. We used 392 
the CCI-Land Cover Tools (v. 3.14) to regrid the land cover data from the original 300 m 393 
spatial resolution to the half-degree resolution of the CRU data. Two regions were selected 394 
based on comparable agricultural extent and climate with GB: US Great Plains (87W to 395 
113W; 35N to 49N) and an area covering northern Eurasia (10W to 50E; 43N to 60N). We 396 
also include data from over the UK, which shows a similar increasing trend in arable share 397 
with lower rainfall values (above 300 mm). We define arable as rain-fed crops, including land 398 
with herbaceous, tree or shrub cover, and pasture is defined as mosaic herbaceous and 399 
grassland. The turning point estimated for GB is similar to that observed for the US Great 400 
Plains and a little lower for EurAsia (the latter might reflect differences in crop types used). 401 
In both cases the fall in arable share for rainfall below the turning point is sharper than our 402 
estimation, suggesting that we apply a conservative approach. In addition to complex rainfall 403 
patterns being more difficult to predict, there is also the issue of predicting how evenly 404 
distributed the rainfall is over the growing season. This would be interesting to explore in 405 
another study, as well as crop variations. 406 
Our agricultural model does not explicitly account for the introduction of technological 407 
advances in the form of new crops, etc., which could also help to attenuate the negative 408 
impacts of the AMOC collapse. Effects other than temperature and rainfall, in particular CO2 409 
fertilization are not accounted for, and CO2 fertilization has the potential to increase the 410 
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water-use efficiency of C3 crop plants and thus reduce the corresponding irrigation demand62. 411 
Any agricultural model should be sensitive to prices and subsidies, and ours is no exception. 412 
Arable farm profit margins are typically higher than for beef and sheep livestocking. While 413 
dairy farms currently enjoy high per hectare margins (see the statistics in Fezzi, et al.63), the 414 
capital costs of moving into such production are prohibitive for most livestock farms and 415 
many small dairy farms are uneconomic64.  416 
Economic analysis 417 
Estimates of changes in farm profitability for the four scenarios are calculated using country 418 
estimates of arable and grassland profitability. Profitability figures are taken from the Farm 419 
Business Survey (FBS)65 for England and Wales and the Farm Business Income (FBI) survey 420 
for Scotland57. Arable profitability is calculated as the average profitability per hectare from 421 
cereal and general-cropping farming for a medium sized farm. Grassland profitability is 422 
dependent on whether the land is classified as being in Less Favoured Areas (LFAs). LFAs 423 
were introduced by the European Union to support farming where production conditions are 424 
difficult and are defined according to the different physical and socio-economic 425 
characteristics across the regions. LFAs are available for England in 426 
https://magic.defra.gov.uk/Dataset_Download_Summary.htm, Scotland in 427 
https://data.gov.uk/dataset/a1ba43dd-569c-47e9-9623-21664aaf49ff/less-favoured-areas. For 428 
Wales we estimate LFAs by taking the lowland areas classified in LandMap 429 
(http://lle.gov.wales/catalogue/item/LandmapVisualSensory/?lang=en). Extended Data 430 
Figure 1 shows the changes in farm profitability for farms in England, Scotland and Wales 431 
under the four scenarios. Agricultural prices and irrigation costs are fixed throughout the 432 
economic analyses assuming 2017/18 prices.  433 
In principle, the irrigation water demands considered in our analyses could be met from either 434 
storage of water during the wetter, non-growing season, or spatial redistribution from those 435 
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areas of GB with surplus rainfall. Irrigation costs are estimated using values from a recent 436 
study on the costs of irrigating wheat production in the East of England35 which estimates 437 
total system costs for irrigation at £163.60 per hectare. Under the scenario with smooth 438 
climate and technological change, areas in GB with insufficient rainfall for arable production 439 
(14% of GB grid cells) require, on average, an additional 18 mm of rainfall in the growing 440 
season. Under a scenario with abrupt climate and technological change, areas in GB that 441 
require irrigation (54% of grid cells), require an additional 70 mm in the growing season. To 442 
meet this latter shortfall, water could be redistributed across the country from areas that do 443 
not require irrigation—there is an average excess (after use) of 167 mm of rainfall in the 444 
growing season in these areas. This equates to a positive difference of 39 mm across GB: in 445 
other words, there is sufficient rainfall within GB to meet all irrigation needs. However, as 446 
discussed in the main text, the costs of these technological interventions dwarf the benefits 447 
they would provide (Table 1). 448 
Sensitivity analysis 449 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the impact the climate variables (temperature 450 
and rainfall) have on arable share. Extended Data Figure 2 provides the lower and upper 451 
quartiles of the temperature and rainfall for selected years, over the previous 30 years (as 452 
used in the agricultural model). Using the different combinations of the lower and upper 453 
quartiles of the temperature and rainfall, together with the means used in the original analysis, 454 
we generate eight additional arable fraction values. The ranges of these outputs are displayed 455 
in Extended Data Figure 2 and Extended Data Figure 9 for the different scenarios. 456 
The ranges of arable fractions suggest that the ranking of the scenarios is consistent when 457 
compared to the ranking obtained using the means. The worst scenario for the arable fraction 458 
remains the abrupt climate with no technological change which drops from a range of 19% - 459 
34% in 2020 to 3% - 16% by 2080. The best scenario remains the smooth climate with 460 
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technological change which increases from 19% - 34% in 2020 to 28% - 52% by 2080. The 461 
results show that climate projection variance is important in determining land use outputs. 462 
The arable fraction ranges presented in Extended Data Figure 2 are wide, reflecting the 463 
uncertainty in the climate projections. This uncertainty also translates into uncertainty in the 464 
economic analysis, the economic value ranges from the sensitivity analysis are displayed in 465 
Extended Data Figure 10 for the different scenarios. Despite the wide ranges around the 466 
economic values, the patterns are still consistent with those reported in the main text, abrupt 467 
climate change generates a major reduction in the value of agricultural output, falling by 468 
£218 to £393million per annum, representing a substantial reduction in total income from GB 469 
farming. The ranges on the costs of irrigation become very wide as the upper quartile for 470 
rainfall results in lower demand for irrigation while the lower quartile results in higher 471 
demand leading to wider uncertainty about the costs of scenarios 2 and 4.  472 
 473 
Data Availability 474 
The modelled output data that support the findings of this study are openly available from 475 
Smith and Ritchie66.  476 
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Extended Data Figures662 
 663 
Extended Data Figure 1. Changes in farm profitability between 2020 and 2060 and 664 
between 2020 and 2080. 665 
 666 
Extended Data Figure 2. Predicted farm allocation to arable land for individual years 667 




Extended Data Figure 3. Time series of mean temperature, total rainfall for the growing 670 
season and arable share for the four scenarios considered. a) Temperature and rainfall in 671 
Great Britain with AMOC maintained and collapsed over 2020 to 2080. b) Mean arable 672 
fraction of agricultural land in Great Britain with AMOC maintained or collapsed and 673 





Extended Data Figure 4. Mean temperature and total rainfall for spring and summer 677 
(March-August) in steady state runs of the AMOC maintained and collapsed. a) - c) 678 
Mean temperature and d) – f) mean total rainfall for a), d) a maintained AMOC and b), e) 679 
collapsed AMOC13,20. c), f) Plots the difference between the means of the AMOC maintained 680 
and collapsed; a positive (negative) value represents an increase (decrease) for an AMOC 681 




Extended Data Figure 5. Impact of an AMOC collapse on temperature and rainfall 684 
across various climate model freshwater hosing experiments. First row, model used in 685 




Extended Data Figure 6. Surface observations of the mean temperature and total 688 
rainfall for the growing season for 1960-1989. a) Mean temperature and b) mean total 689 









Extended Data Figure 8. Estimated impact of temperature and rainfall on arable land 695 
share in Great Britain from the agricultural model. Estimated fraction of arable share in 696 
Great Britain based on a) temperature and b) rainfall. For b) only: arable shares based on 697 
land cover data from Northern Eurasia (Eurasia), United Kingdom (UK), and the US Great 698 
Plains (USGP).  699 
 700 
Extended Data Figure 9. Impact sensitivity analysis of climate variables has on arable 701 
land share for 2020. a) GB map of arable farmland for using the lower quartile temperature 702 
and rainfall. b) GB map of arable farmland for using the upper quartile temperature and 703 
lower quartile rainfall. c) GB map of arable farmland for using the mean temperature and 704 
rainfall. d) GB map of arable farmland for using the lower quartile temperature and upper 705 
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Extended Data Figure 10. Net impact range on GB agriculture of smooth versus tipping 710 
point (AMOC collapse) climate change, with and without ameliorative measures 711 
(technological response) using lower and upper quartile of temperature and rainfall for 712 
previous 30-year growing seasons (April-September). 713 
